1 0627/429 -2- I think I gave you in a letter I wrote to you on the 9th
in the the main details of the situation as it was put before us in
Belfast. It took Carson an hour & a half to explain the
situation at the private meeting of the Unionist Council, & I
cannot pretend to tell you all he told us; but the main point
was this - The Cabinet having unamimously decided that under the
pressure of difficulties with America, the Colonies Parliament
(but chiefly with America) they must offer Redmond Home Rule
at once; but that am (not being prepared to coerce Ulster) they had having
authorised Lloyd George to arrange a settlement, Carson, after what
happened at the Buckingham palace Conference in 1914, could
not well refuse to submit to his followers the exclusion of six
counties as a basis of negotiation. Carson had satisfied him
- self apparently that he had lost all the ground he & his
colleagues had gained in their anti-Home Rule campaign before the
war, & that the majority of the Unioniist members & voters
took the same view as the majority of the Unionist papers as to
the necessity of a settlement. If Ulster Unionists refused to
consider such a settlement the Nationalists & Radicals would
hold them up to odium as the people who were preventing a settle-
ment of the Irish question, & they could not hope for any sympathy
or support in Great Britain now or hereafter. The Home Rule Act
was on the Statute Book andnow that the Unionist leaders in the
Coalitiion Government had become parties ofto a proposal to bring
it into immediate operation in 26 counties where was no hope 2 0627/429 -3- of removing it from the Statute Book at the end of the war . If we did not agree to
a settlement we should have the Home Rule Act coming into
operation without the exclusion of any part of Ulster, or subject
only to some worthless Amending Act which Asquith might bring in
in fulfilment of this pledge, & we should either have to
submit to this fight. To begin fighting here at the end
of the great war would be hopeless & we could not hope for any
support. If, in spite of our apparent weakness we succeeded
in our fight we could not possibly hope to get more than we
were now offered without fighting, viz the exclusion of six
counties, we should probably get less: therefore We should be
in a better position to hold our own and help our friends with
only six counties excluded returning 16 Unionists and 9 Nationalists
then we should be with 9 counties excluded returning 17 Nationalists
& 16 Unionists. perhapsWe should be in a better position to
help Unionists in any part of Ireland if we are excluded than if
we formed portion of a permanent minority in a Dublin Parliament:
therefore on the whole Carson was justified in coming to us &
recommending us to authorise him to enter upon negotiations on
the bases of the exclusion of the six counties, & the chief reasons
ofrfor recommending us to agree to this were:- (1 ) that if we did
not agree to do this we should lose any remaining sympathy
we had in Great Britain as the people who had prevented Ireland
being pacified. (2) That if we did not take this offer we should
never get as good a one again. ( 3 ) that the Cabinet having 3 0627/029 -4- unanimously made up their minds to give some form of Home Rule
at once we could not prevent it: of course if the Home Rulers
themselves refused the offer that is a different pair of shoes. It appears now however, that Lloyd George told a great
many lies, & that some of the Unionist members of the Cabinet
were not parties to the decision which was the basis of all this
negotiating. I conjecture that Walter Long and Lansdown were
both rather ill at the time and did not fully take the thing
in, and that Bonar Law was, as my friend says he found him,
last week, helpless in face of Colonial opinion in favour of
Home Rule; but if Redmond's Convention refuses to accept the
terms in spite of his having corroborated interpreted them in a different
sense to that conveyed to Carson by Lloyd George of course,
the thing must fall to the ground, and then the Nationalists,
and not the Unionists will carry the blame for preventing the
settlement. The only danger is that Lloyd George should come
back to us & say that the Nationalists wont accept the six county
basis you must sacrifice something more for the sake of the Empire
and agree to a four county basis or to no exclusion. Carson
will, I am confident, refuse to put any such proposal before the
Unionist Council. It was quite clearly understood that the
six counties was minimum. The Nationalists will then try
after all to say that we were the people that prevented Ireland
being pacified: but I do not think they would succeed, as all
the papers have put on record their view of the reasonableness
of our decision. 4 0627/429 -5- Carson holds a letter from Lloyd George stating that the
proposed Amendment of the Government of Ireland Act is to be
a definitive one & not an Emergency Measure for the duration
of the war; but of course if the Nationalists refuse to approve
of the whole thing tomorrow even as presented to them by Redmond
that question will not arise. The Ulster Unionists will be
more or less on velvet when the matter comes to be finally settled. The machine is evidently being worked for all it is
worth to secure a decision at to-day's Nationalist Convention
in favour of agreeing to the Lloyd George Settlement; but it
seems to me that if Redmond accomplishes this his difficulties
will be only beginning. I was in Dublin for two or three days
last week, & the Southerners I met are all convinced that there
will be another rebellion whether the Lloyd George terms are
accepted or not. The fact that these terms were suggested has
enormously strengthened the Sinn Feiners in the country. The
mischief has been done by the suggestion. The acceptance of the
suggestion by the Ulster Unionists has not had much effect on
this part of the question. The Unionists acceptance under protest
had only increased Redmond's difficulties, & as we are given to
believe placed us in the position in the eyes of British public
opinion of being reasonable people. If Redmond actually
forms a Government and tries to rule this country the Rebellion 5 0627/429 -6- will be directed against him; if he does not the Rebellion will
be directed against the existing Government: in any case
the country will have more or less to be reconquered outside the
six counties, and that may possibly be the best way out of all our
troubles which all have their root in the British Prime Minister
having brought in a Home Rule Bill. The only actual serious
harm done by the action taken by the Ulster Unionists on Carson's
advice is the creation of bad feeling towards us among those who
think we have abandoned them in order to secure the privileged
position for ourselves. I don't think this charge is justified;
but it is difficult to get it out of the heads of our Southern
friends. I have just seen the Morning Post & think the remark
with which they begin their leader is not very far astray.
To set our Government against the German Government is
rather like putting a doe rabbit to fight a tom cat 6 0627/429/44 P.S. What puzzles me most, about this Lloyd George Irish
Settlement business is, that you should apparently be quite
ignorant of the other cause of the whole thing, which must be a
F O matter, & though you are on a particular job, it seems
to me that the nature of that job would require you to be
informed of a critical matter of that kind , although the original despatch, or whatever it was
did not pass through your hands. I do not think that Carson
or Craig or the other Irish Unionist members would have e taken
Lloyd George's word without corroboration for the exceedingly
alarming nature of the complication which induced the Cabinet (as
C& C were given to believe) unanimously to resolve to give Redmond Home Rule at once
& ask Lloyd George to arrange for it being done peaceably
as regards Ulster. From the way in which both Craig & Carson
put the matter to us at Belfast I am convinced that they were
convinced that the Cabinet were unanimously resolved to do this.
and that the American and Colonial complications were of a
sufficiently serious nature to account for, (though not to excuse
or justify) such a very unfortunate decision. From what I have
heard since, I think it is probable that they obtained their
information in corroboration of what Lloyd George told them
from Bonar Law, as I saw a man yesterday who saw Bonar Law
last week, and said he appeared to be absolutely helpless. Under these circumstances I do not find any difficulty
in understanding why Carson came to the conclusion that it
would be bad tactics to simply oppose the introduction of a
measure of Home Rule at the present time.