Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery, 1916 Letters 1916-1923 Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery

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This is a typed copy of letter written by Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery (1844-1924). The first page is missing. Montgomery was a lawyer and politician. Originally a Liberal and a strong supporter of Gladstone, Montgomery was also a firm Unionist, but by 1916 he believed that Ulster Unionists had no choice but to accept Lloyd George's proposal for a six-county Northern Ireland. The letter concerns details arising from a private Ulster Unionist Council meeting in Belfast and the British Cabinet decision to offer John Redmond (1856-1918) Home Rule due to international pressure. In addition to this, they have authorized Lloyd George to make a settlement so as not to coerce Ulster into Home Rule. The basis for this settlement is a six county Ulster. Montgomery writes that it would be better to maintain a six county exclusion rather than a nine county exclusion in order to keep the ratio of Unionists to Nationalists in the Unionist's favour. The opinions expressed by Montgomery in this letter reflect the importance Unionists placed on international perception in order for their cause to be successful. Montgomery also writes that while in Dublin he got the impression that another rebellion was imminent whether the terms put forward by Lloyd George were accepted or not.

Public Record Office of Northern Ireland Montgomery of Blessingborn Papers; D/627/429/44 https://letters1916.ie/item/2252 English Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery 1916 Male 1924 Politics Politics

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 0627/429 -2- I think I gave you in a letter I wrote to you on the 9thin the the main details of the situation as it was put before us inBelfast. It took Carson an hour & a half to explain thesituation at the private meeting of the Unionist Council, & Icannot pretend to tell you all he told us; but the main pointwas this - The Cabinet having unamimously decided that under thepressure of difficulties with America, the Colonies Parliament(but chiefly with America) they must offer Redmond Home Ruleat once; but that am (not being prepared to coerce Ulster) they had havingauthorised Lloyd George to arrange a settlement, Carson, after whathappened at the Buckingham palace Conference in 1914, couldnot well refuse to submit to his followers the exclusion of sixcounties as a basis of negotiation. Carson had satisfied him- self apparently that he had lost all the ground he & hiscolleagues had gained in their anti-Home Rule campaign before thewar, & that the majority of the Unioniist members & voterstook the same view as the majority of the Unionist papers as tothe necessity of a settlement. If Ulster Unionists refused toconsider such a settlement the Nationalists & Radicals wouldhold them up to odium as the people who were preventing a settle-ment of the Irish question, & they could not hope for any sympathyor support in Great Britain now or hereafter. The Home Rule Actwas on the Statute Book andnow that the Unionist leaders in theCoalitiion Government had become parties ofto a proposal to bringit into immediate operation in 26 counties where was no hope 0627/429 -3- of removing it from the Statute Book at the end of the war . If we did not agree toa settlement we should have the Home Rule Act coming intooperation without the exclusion of any part of Ulster, or subjectonly to some worthless Amending Act which Asquith might bring inin fulfilment of this pledge, & we should either have tosubmit to this fight. To begin fighting here at the endof the great war would be hopeless & we could not hope for anysupport. If, in spite of our apparent weakness we succeededin our fight we could not possibly hope to get more than wewere now offered without fighting, viz the exclusion of sixcounties, we should probably get less: therefore We should bein a better position to hold our own and help our friends withonly six counties excluded returning 16 Unionists and 9 Nationaliststhen we should be with 9 counties excluded returning 17 Nationalists& 16 Unionists. perhapsWe should be in a better position tohelp Unionists in any part of Ireland if we are excluded than ifwe formed portion of a permanent minority in a Dublin Parliament:therefore on the whole Carson was justified in coming to us &recommending us to authorise him to enter upon negotiations onthe bases of the exclusion of the six counties, & the chief reasonsofrfor recommending us to agree to this were:- (1 ) that if we didnot agree to do this we should lose any remaining sympathywe had in Great Britain as the people who had prevented Irelandbeing pacified. (2) That if we did not take this offer we shouldnever get as good a one again. ( 3 ) that the Cabinet having 0627/029 -4- unanimously made up their minds to give some form of Home Ruleat once we could not prevent it: of course if the Home Rulersthemselves refused the offer that is a different pair of shoes. It appears now however, that Lloyd George told a greatmany lies, & that some of the Unionist members of the Cabinetwere not parties to the decision which was the basis of all thisnegotiating. I conjecture that Walter Long and Lansdown wereboth rather ill at the time and did not fully take the thingin, and that Bonar Law was, as my friend says he found him,last week, helpless in face of Colonial opinion in favour ofHome Rule; but if Redmond's Convention refuses to accept theterms in spite of his having corroborated interpreted them in a differentsense to that conveyed to Carson by Lloyd George of course,the thing must fall to the ground, and then the Nationalists,and not the Unionists will carry the blame for preventing thesettlement. The only danger is that Lloyd George should comeback to us & say that the Nationalists wont accept the six countybasis you must sacrifice something more for the sake of the Empireand agree to a four county basis or to no exclusion. Carsonwill, I am confident, refuse to put any such proposal before theUnionist Council. It was quite clearly understood that thesix counties was minimum. The Nationalists will then tryafter all to say that we were the people that prevented Irelandbeing pacified: but I do not think they would succeed, as allthe papers have put on record their view of the reasonablenessof our decision. 0627/429 -5- Carson holds a letter from Lloyd George stating that theproposed Amendment of the Government of Ireland Act is to bea definitive one & not an Emergency Measure for the durationof the war; but of course if the Nationalists refuse to approveof the whole thing tomorrow even as presented to them by Redmondthat question will not arise. The Ulster Unionists will bemore or less on velvet when the matter comes to be finally settled. The machine is evidently being worked for all it isworth to secure a decision at to-day's Nationalist Conventionin favour of agreeing to the Lloyd George Settlement; but itseems to me that if Redmond accomplishes this his difficultieswill be only beginning. I was in Dublin for two or three dayslast week, & the Southerners I met are all convinced that therewill be another rebellion whether the Lloyd George terms areaccepted or not. The fact that these terms were suggested hasenormously strengthened the Sinn Feiners in the country. Themischief has been done by the suggestion. The acceptance of thesuggestion by the Ulster Unionists has not had much effect onthis part of the question. The Unionists acceptance under protesthad only increased Redmond's difficulties, & as we are given tobelieve placed us in the position in the eyes of British publicopinion of being reasonable people. If Redmond actuallyforms a Government and tries to rule this country the Rebellion 0627/429 -6- will be directed against him; if he does not the Rebellion willbe directed against the existing Government: in any casethe country will have more or less to be reconquered outside thesix counties, and that may possibly be the best way out of all ourtroubles which all have their root in the British Prime Ministerhaving brought in a Home Rule Bill. The only actual seriousharm done by the action taken by the Ulster Unionists on Carson'sadvice is the creation of bad feeling towards us among those whothink we have abandoned them in order to secure the privilegedposition for ourselves. I don't think this charge is justified;but it is difficult to get it out of the heads of our Southernfriends. I have just seen the Morning Post & think the remarkwith which they begin their leader is not very far astray.To set our Government against the German Government israther like putting a doe rabbit to fight a tom cat 0627/429/44 P.S. What puzzles me most, about this Lloyd George IrishSettlement business is, that you should apparently be quiteignorant of the other cause of the whole thing, which must be aF O matter, & though you are on a particular job, it seemsto me that the nature of that job would require you to beinformed of a critical matter of that kind , although the original despatch, or whatever it wasdid not pass through your hands. I do not think that Carsonor Craig or the other Irish Unionist members would have e takenLloyd George's word without corroboration for the exceedinglyalarming nature of the complication which induced the Cabinet (asC& C were given to believe) unanimously to resolve to give Redmond Home Rule at once& ask Lloyd George to arrange for it being done peaceablyas regards Ulster. From the way in which both Craig & Carsonput the matter to us at Belfast I am convinced that they wereconvinced that the Cabinet were unanimously resolved to do this.and that the American and Colonial complications were of asufficiently serious nature to account for, (though not to excuseor justify) such a very unfortunate decision. From what I haveheard since, I think it is probable that they obtained theirinformation in corroboration of what Lloyd George told themfrom Bonar Law, as I saw a man yesterday who saw Bonar Lawlast week, and said he appeared to be absolutely helpless. Under these circumstances I do not find any difficultyin understanding why Carson came to the conclusion that itwould be bad tactics to simply oppose the introduction of ameasure of Home Rule at the present time. Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to William Coote, 25 March 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenerg Montgomery to Edward Carson, 31 May 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Edward Carson, 9 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Willis, 10 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Edward Carson, 9 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to 'Canon', 10 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to W. G. Vance, 13 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Vernon, 15 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Willis, 15 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Hamilton, 10 June 1916Letter to Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery from Walter Long, 2 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to George Francis Stewart, 17 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to James Stronge, 3 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to John Edward Fowler Sclater, 3 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to James Stronge, 9 June 1916.Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Mr Glasgow, 18 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to George Francis Stewart, 18 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Hugo, 27 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Maurice Headlam, 19 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery, 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Charles Hubert Montgomery, 30 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to William Hovenden Ffolliott, 2 August 1916Letter from Charles Hubert Montgomery to Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery, 29 May 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to John Ross, 27 May 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to William Coote, 27 May 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to William Coote, 22 May 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Waldron, 26 June 1916Letter to Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery from Sir John Ross, 2 June 1916.Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Sir Richard Dawson Bates, 23 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to William Coote, 9 Spetember 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Walter Long, 31 May 1916Letter from M. E. Sinclair to Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery, 18 September 1916