Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to George Francis Stewart, 17 June 1916 Letters 1916-1923 Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery

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This is a copy of a letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery (1844-1924) to George Francis Stewart (1851-1928). Originally a Liberal and a strong supporter of Gladstone, Montgomery was also a firm Unionist, but by 1916 he believed that Ulster Unionists had no choice but to accept Lloyd George's proposal for a six-county Northern Ireland. Stewart was a land agent and southern unionist. He became vice-president of the Land Owners Association and became heavily involved in southern unionists campaigns against partition due to Home Rule. His willingness, with other southern Unionists, to strike a deal with John Redmond (1856-1918), Irish Parliamentary Party leader, regarding partition resulted in a dispute within the Irish Unionist Alliance. In this letter Montgomery discusses his support for Edward Carson (1854-1935), Unionist leader, to enter negotiations about Home Rule based on the exclusion of six counties in Ulster. Montgomery states he will explain his view in an enclosed letter he previously sent to Unionist leaders including Edward Carson, James Craig (1871-1940), and Walter Long (1854-1924). Unfortunately this enclosure is not available. Montgomery goes on to describe a private meeting he had with Craig, in with Craig described the pressure America is putting on Britain to grant Home Rule to Ireland, noting that David Lloyd George MP (1863-1945) will arrange the settlement. Montgomery also notes that Carson will not continue talks unless the six county scheme is the basis for negotiations, noting that rejection of this by Unionists will alienate them from other British parties. The letter also discusses the benefits of a Unionist majority in a six county Ulster than a minority in a nine county Ulster, stating the political position is embarrassing. Montgomery comments on the lack of leadership by Herbert Henry Asquith (1852-1928), prime minister. The letter also discusses the view of Redmond that it is a provisional scheme and not a permanent one, stating that Carson wishes for the scheme to be enacted in a Government of Ireland Act and not simply an emergency provision.

 Public Record Office of Northern Ireland Montgomery of Blessingborn Papers; D/627/429/39 https://letters1916.ie/item/2243 English Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery 1916-06-17 George Francis Stewart Male 1924 Politics Politics

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 0627/429 Copy 17th June, 1916. My dear Stewart, If you think it would be better for me, having beena party to the decision of the Ulster Unionist Council lastMonday, not to attend the meeting of the Executive Committeeof the I.U.A. please tell me so. It will be time enough ifyou do so at the landowners' meeting at noon on Wednesday;otherwise I propose to attend, as I think it very importantthat Northern & Southern Unionists should keep in touch,in spite of having to take somewhat divergent lines in thepresent crisis. I cannot, or course, take up the time of the meetingon Wednesday, if I attend, by explaining my position at length;but I should like you to be acquainted with it. I cannot describe the frame of mind in which I approachedthe crisis better than by enclosing a letter which I wrotelast month when the rot in the English papers began. Beforesending it for publication, however, I consulted a well-informedpermanent official in London of strong Unionist views. Isend you his answers in accordance therewith. I sent copiesof the letter to Carson, Craig, Sclater, Stronge and Walter Long. When I went to Belfast on Monday night the 5th inst.Craig asked me and two others into a private room at theclub to explain his and Carson's position. I cannot put allhe told me, or all Carson told the standing Committee and the 0627/429 -2- Council at private meetings subsequently into a letter. Theupshot of it was, that they were at the end of their tether,as the Cabinet had really unanimously decided, that under thepressure of difficulties with America, the Colonies aand inParliament, but chiefly with America, they must offer RedmondHome Rule at once; but that they did not wish to coerce Ulster,& had authorised Lloyd George to arrange a settlement. Carsonhad agreed to submit to his followers the exclusion of sixcounties as a basis of negotiation. Till they had agreed tothis basis he refused to go any further or to meet any Nationalists.They Carson and Craig found all the ground they had gained in their anti Home RuleCampaign before the war had slipped away under the influence ofthe war, and that the majority of the Unionist Members andvoters took the same views as the majority of the Unionistpapers as to the necessity of a settlement. If Ulster Unionists refused to consider such a settlementthey could not hope for any sympathy or support in Great Britainnow or hereafter. The Home Rule Act was on the Statute Bookand now that the Unionists Leaders in the Coalition Governmentwere parties to a proposal to bring it into immediate operationthere was no hope of removing it from the Statute Book. If wedid not agree to a settlement we should have the Home Rule Actcoming into operation without the exclusion of any part, ofUlster. * We should either have to submit to this, or to fight.To begin fighting here at the end of the Great War would be *or subject only to some worthless amending act which Asquithmight bring in in fulfilment of his worthless pledge. D627/429 -3- hopeless, & we could not hope for any support. If in spiteof these drawbacks, our fighting succeeded, we could not hope toget more than we are now offered,ize. the exclusion of sixcounties. We should be in a better position to hold our own andhelp our friends with six counties returning 16 Unionists &9 Nationalist Members than we should be with nine countiesexcluded returning 17 Nationalist and 16 Unionist Members. We should be in a better position to help Unionists in any partof Ireland if we were excluded than if we formed portion of apermanent minority in a Dublin Parliament. This is, I think, the pith of the more important partof what Carson & Craig told us; but it is only a part. After considering the matter & hearing what you had tosay in Dublin on 7th, I wrote to Carson (enclosure three. 3 The Cavan, Donegal & Monaghan protest & the solutionssubmitted to the Council by Casron appeared to me to fulfilmy conditions, & I therefore very reluctantly became a party to the decision. The position is humiliating, but the humiliation is broughton us by His Majesty's Ministers. I can only suppose that thereasons for such a extraordinary & humiliating policy musthave been very strong in order to overcome the objections ofWalter Long, Bonar Law, etc. Had our ruler been a man andnot an Asquith some other way would have been found; but ourGovernment & Parliament has, as the Morning post calls it,been Asquixiated. As regards the question between definitive D627/429 -4- and provisional. I have no doubt that what Carson put before theUnionist Council was what Lloyd George had put before him. Redmondfinding he had to deal with such determined opposition to thepartition of Ireland has tried to smooth it down by making it appearthat the Amending Bill is to be a Provisional Emergency Measure.Whether Lloyd George has given any countenance to this versionwe, of course, do not know. I think Asquith's statement, whichis in some quarters being represented as a confirmation of thetruth of Redmond's version is ambiguous. Carson in addressing the Unionist Council made mentionof the proposed Imperial Conference; but in view of possiblechanges of the Constitution consequent on that Conference Asquithmight call the proposed Irish settlement provisional withoutbeing supposed to contradict Carson's view that the exclusionof the six counties should be embodied in a definitive Governmentof Ireland Amendment Act & not in a mere Emergency ProvisionalMeasure. Carson Laid stress on the importance of the ImperialConference finding an excluded Ulster and not an unamended or inadequately amended HomeRule Act on the Statute Book. To sum up: - As there seems no alternative between thismiserable Asquith Coalition Government and chaos, we mustsubmit to a decision positively come to by the Ministry & putthe whole responsibility upon them. Under these circumstances I agreed to the Belfast Resolutionswith great disgust (1) because I believed that if we did not, neitherUlster n or any other Irish Unionists would be able to get any effective D627/429 -5- sympathy in Great Britain. (2) that if we refused the settlementnow offered we should either find ourselves under Home Rulewithout any counties excluded, or possibly with only four ortwo counties excluded. There would be a risk of Belfastagreeing to some such arrangement & leaving the rest of usout in the cold; lastly because I believe that we could helpSouthern Unionists better if we were, so to speak, on dryland than if we agreed all to drown together in a Home Ruleflood. I am sorry to inflict such a long letter on so busy aman; but I wanted you to understand my position more clearlythen I shall probably have any opportunity of making it whenwe meet in Dublin next week. Yours very truly, P.S. All the Ulster Unionist Council decided was, to approveof Carson entering into negotiations on the six county basis.He can still break off negotiations on any other point. Wehave so far merelybeing been manoeuvring for position. There isa good deal of breathing time (1) before the basis of negotiationsis accepted by both sides. (2) before the negotiations come toanything; (3) if they do come to anything, before John Redmondgets his Parliament into motion: meantime I suppose Sir JohnMaxwell sits tight in spite of County Council Resolutions, etc.. Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to William Coote, 25 March 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenerg Montgomery to Edward Carson, 31 May 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Edward Carson, 9 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Willis, 10 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Edward Carson, 9 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to 'Canon', 10 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to W. G. Vance, 13 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Vernon, 15 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Willis, 15 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Hamilton, 10 June 1916Letter to Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery from Walter Long, 2 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to George Francis Stewart, 17 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to James Stronge, 3 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to John Edward Fowler Sclater, 3 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to James Stronge, 9 June 1916.Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Mr Glasgow, 18 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to George Francis Stewart, 18 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Hugo, 27 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Maurice Headlam, 19 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery, 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Charles Hubert Montgomery, 30 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to William Hovenden Ffolliott, 2 August 1916Letter from Charles Hubert Montgomery to Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery, 29 May 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to John Ross, 27 May 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to William Coote, 27 May 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to William Coote, 22 May 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Waldron, 26 June 1916Letter to Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery from Sir John Ross, 2 June 1916.Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Sir Richard Dawson Bates, 23 June 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to William Coote, 9 Spetember 1916Letter from Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery to Walter Long, 31 May 1916Letter from M. E. Sinclair to Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery, 18 September 1916